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Abstract
Recently, there has been a proliferation of studies investigating the relationship between diversity 
and outcomes such as social cohesion and civic mindedness. This article addresses several 
common problems in this field and, using data for British neighbourhoods, elaborates on the 
experiences of both white British and ethnic minority respondents. We conclude that, if anything, 
diversity should be encouraged to cement the integration progress of migrants and foster stronger 
identification with Britain in the second generation. Deprivation at the neighbourhood level along 
with individual factors such as fear of crime is a much stronger predictor of deterioration of the 
civic spirit than diversity. Bridging contacts have the expected strong positive association with 
cohesion outcomes; and contrary to policy concerns no strong negative impact is observed for 
associational bonding among minority ingroupers.
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Introduction
An increasing number of academic studies have examined the processes of ethnic diver-
sification and their impact upon the cohesiveness of British communities, testing specifi-
cally whether it is ethnic heterogeneity or economic disadvantage which taxes most the 
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strength of the social glue (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010; Laurence, 2011; Laurence and 
Heath, 2008; Letki, 2008; Sturgis et al., 2011; Twigg et al., 2010).
A particular theme in the literature is that diversity may lead to what Putnam has 
termed ‘hunkering down’. That is, diversity is alleged to reduce trust in neighbours and 
fellow-citizens, whether they are from the same or from a different ethnic group, and 
leads to a reduction in civic engagement and participation generally. A second theme, 
which is conceptually distinct, is that diversity may lead to inter-ethnic tensions: thus 
each group may retreat into distinct ethnic strongholds, ‘apart from each other’, sharing 
little in common. This has been described as ‘reactive ethnicity’ (Leifer, 1981; Portes, 
1999). These are distinct ways in which diversity may undermine social cohesion. It is 
perfectly possible that diversity might lead to ‘hunkering down’ without generating reac-
tive ethnicity, and vice versa.
In this article, we aim to explore a wider range of outcomes than has been usual in the 
literature, investigating both subjective and behavioural measures of hunkering down as 
well as a measure of reactive ethnicity. We also compare the ways in which both the 
majority and the minority groups respond to ethnic diversity. It is sometimes implicitly 
assumed that diversity has opposite effects on majority and minorities respectively. Thus 
ethnic heterogeneity is assumed to have harmful effects on the majority population, lead-
ing them to hunker down, while, conversely, ethnic homogeneity is assumed to have 
harmful effects on the minority population, leading them to withdraw from the wider 
society and to maintain distinct ethnic identities rather than identifying with the wider 
British society. In this article therefore we investigate whether or not the effects of diver-
sity are symmetrical. We also explore some of the mechanisms that may lie behind the 
assumed negative or positive effects of diversity, namely theories of threat and of 
contact.
Theory and Hypothesis Building
In just a few years, there has been a dramatic rise in academic and policy interest in the 
possible effects of diversity and the implications of growing neighbourhood heterogene-
ity for modern community life, integration and social cooperation. The majority of stud-
ies have focused on the relationship between diversity and trust, and the results appear 
rather pessimistic when data from the USA is used (Hero, 2003). Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2000, 2002) found that trust in general and, more specifically, interpersonal trust is 
lower in more racially heterogeneous communities in the USA. Stolle et al. (2008), com-
paring the USA and Canada, observed a strong negative effect of heterogeneity on trust. 
However, they also found that contact may neutralize, but not reverse, the sign of this 
effect. In this debate one name is particularly prominent, that of the American political 
scientist Robert Putnam, who argued (2007) that heterogeneity in neighbourhoods low-
ers trust both in people from other ethnic groups and in people from one’s own ethnic 
group. Thus, diversity seems to undermine the social glue and, in Putnam’s words, to 
push people towards ‘hunkering down’.
In contrast, the evidence from mainland Europe is much more mixed (Delhey and 
Newton, 2005; Gerritsen and Lubbens, 2010; Gesthuizen et al., 2009; Kesler and 
Bloemraad, 2010). The British data do not fully conform to the US pattern either. 
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Fieldhouse and Cutts (2010) compared the USA and the UK and suggested that in 
England, diversity is only one of a number of factors that are equally important in 
accounting for variations in neighbourhood social cohesion, with economic deprivation 
playing a major role in the deterioration of civicness. Laurence and Heath (2008) and 
Letki (2008), looking at different predictors of social cohesion in respectively the 2001 
and 2005 Citizenship Surveys, found that when the association between diversity and 
economic deprivation is accounted for, there is no strong evidence that heterogeneity 
erodes trust. Still, with British data based on the Citizenship Survey 2005, Laurence 
(2011) established that rising diversity is associated with lower levels of neighbourhood 
trust, although people with bridging ties were less likely to have negative sentiments. 
Sturgis et al. (2011) found no association between ‘moralistic’ or generalized trust and 
diversity but an association between diversity and what they term ‘strategic’ trust, that is 
trust in neighbours. Nevertheless, this effect was dwarfed by the powerful effect of eco-
nomic deprivation. A similar result was established by Twigg et al. (2010) who observed 
statistically significant correlations between neighbourhood heterogeneity and a latent 
variable combining indicators of trust and cohesion, but the size of the effect was sub-
stantively small compared to the much larger effect of neighbourhood deprivation 
(Becares et al., 2011, note this too).
How will the present article contribute to the literature? One interesting aspect of the 
overviewed studies is that they all possess a similar structure of analysis and therefore 
exhibit similar theoretical and methodological limitations. In this study, using two British 
datasets with a focus on social capital – the Managing Cultural Diversity Survey (MCDS) 
and Ethnic Minority British Election Study 2010 (EMBES 2010) – we address four 
major shortcomings and offer a way in which they can be resolved.
Trust=Cohesion, or?
Previous research has elaborated from every possible angle on the relationship between 
trust and diversity. Yet social cohesion is a complex phenomenon that is unlikely to be 
captured by one single measure. The studies described in the previous section show that 
it matters even what type of trust we look into – generalized or neighbourhood (Laurence, 
2011; Sturgis et al., 2011). In this study we examine a wider range of measures relevant 
to social cohesion and civic engagement. We look at measures of generalized trust, 
neighbourhood trust, willingness to help neighbours, and civic participation, which con-
stitute different aspects of hunkering down (see Table 1 for detailed explanation of all the 
variables used in this analysis).1 Unlike the other listed measures of hunkering down, 
which are attitudinal, civic participation is a behavioural measure of engagement 
(Almond and Verba, 1963) which thus provides a tougher test of the negative effects of 
diversity.
To the popular measures of civic engagement such as trust, we also add co-ethnic 
identification. The concept of co-ethnic identification is of considerable interest. 
Sometimes referred to as ‘reactive ethnicity’ or ‘stronghold identity’, it provides an indi-
cator of the salience of ethnic and cultural boundaries vis-a-vis other ethnic groups 
(Leifer, 1981; Portes, 1999). In this study we operationalize reactive ethnicity as strength 
of identification with one’s own ethnic group.
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Table 1. Variable list.
Dependent variables
Generalized trust 0=You can’t be too careful; 1=Most people can 
be trusted
Neighbourhood trust From 0=Low and medium level trust to 
1=Trusting
Willing to help neighbours (MCDS data 
only)
Willing to help neighbours: From 0=Low and 
medium levels to 1=High levels
Weak co-ethnic identity Own ethnicity important. From 0=Identifies 
strongly or average with co-ethnics; to 1=Weak 
identification; (EMBES data distinction is 
between from feeling British to feeling Asian/
Black)
Civic action Variable constructed on the basis of 
participation battery – signing petition, joined 
local group, have written to council, protest, 
joined crime prevention groups (+ boycott 
EMBES data only), other form of participation.
0=No; 1=Yes
Independent variables (Base model)
lnage Natural logarithm of age; mean/sd (MCDS): 
White: 3.774/0.448 Minorities: 3.555/0.388 
mean/sd (EMBES): 3.594/0.037
Gender 0=Male; 1=Female
Marital status 0=Single; 1=Married/Cohabiting; 2=Separated/
Divorced/Widowed
Ethnicity 0=White (MCDS data only); 1=Black 
Caribbean; 2=Black African; 3=Indian; 
4=Pakistani; 5=Bangladeshi; 6=Other ethnic 
group
Generation 0=1st; 1=2nd+
Housing 0=Own; 1=Rent from Council; 2=Rent 
privately; 3=Other
Education 0=No education; 1=GCSE grades A–C or 
equivalent; 2=GCE A level or equivalent; 
3=Higher Diploma; 4=Higher education
Diversity Index of Ethnic Fractionalization; mean/
sd (MCDS) White: 0.330/0.246 Minorities: 
0.661/0.189; mean/sd (EMBES): 0.782/0.217 
Minorities live in general in more diverse 
settings than white British.
Independent variables (Conflict model)
LnIMD Natural logarithm of the Index of Multiple 
Deprivation; mean (MCDS) White: 2.852/0.708 
Minorities: 3.116/0.637; mean (EMBES): 
2.802/1.007
Discrimination (EMBES data only) 0=No; 1=Yes
Economic precariousness (EMBES data 
only)
From 0=Good economic situation to 1=The 
economic situation of respondent got a lot 
worse in recent year
 at UNIV OF ESSEX on February 3, 2015soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Demireva and Heath 647
This is not to say that other studies have not examined outcomes other than trust. Twigg 
et al. (2010) analyse combined measures of cohesion and trust; Letki (2008) focuses on 
informal help between neighbours which we also examine; Laurence and Heath (2008) and 
Becares et al. (2011) look into whether the community is one in which people say they get 
on well together; Fieldhouse and Cutts (2010) look into norms (a scale based on ‘helping 
neighbours’, ‘sharing the same values’, and trust) and participation (a scale based on group 
activity and civic activity). No other study, however, overviews such an extensive range of 
measures and dimensions of cohesion and civic mindedness as we do.
Diversity, Majority and Minority Groups
Unlike previous research, we examine separately the effect of diversity on both majority 
and minority members – a crucial distinction which very few studies attempt (Fieldhouse 
and Cutts, 2010, point to differences between whites and minorities both in terms of 
norms and participation; Becares et al., 2011, distinguish between the effects of propor-
tion of whites versus minority groups and own-group ethnic concentration). This is an 
important limitation in the literature, particularly because the research question of 
whether diversity undermines cohesion seems to have been formulated largely with the 
white majority in mind. Thus, as noted earlier, ethnic heterogeneity seems to be ‘bad’ for 
the majority but ‘good’ for minorities as long as heterogeneity in the case of the latter 
entails greater exposure to white British people. In the literature and policy discourse on 
ethnic minorities (if their cohesion patterns are indeed considered), the focus is on the 
negative effects of co-ethnic concentration on the integration process (Becares et al., 
2011). In this article we therefore investigate whether the effects of diversity are the 
same for both majority and minority groups alike, instead of disregarding its implications 
for minorities or examining segregation2 as problematic solely for minorities (since 
homogeneity among the majority appears viewed as the essence of social glue).
Size of the Effects
We pay particular attention to establishing and taking into account the substantive impor-
tance of the observed relationships. This is necessary because the effect of a certain 
Fear of crime (MCDS data only) From 0=Not worried to 1=Worried
Independent variables (Contact 
model)
 
Bonding contact 1=In organization in which co-ethnics are half 
or more than half of organization; 0=Everybody 
else
Bridging contact From 0=Below the median 1=Median, Above 
the median
N MCDS (white British): 809; MCDS (minorities): 
700; EMBES: 2750; Cases with ‘no answer’ have 
been dropped
Table 1. (Continued)
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predictor can be significant in the narrowly statistical sense but have little substantive 
importance when it comes to shaping the observed patterns (Twigg et al., 2010). Without 
interpretation of the size of the effect, researchers often lapse into vague generalizations, 
or, worse, overestimate or underestimate the role of a particular predictor (Dawkins, 
2008), which is the main criticism of Putnam’s work (Sturgis et al., 2011). To give a 
concrete example, it has been argued that the substantive effect of economic deprivation 
on the erosion of social cohesion may deserve more attention than that of diversity. Other 
studies (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010; Sturgis et al., 2011) have looked into correcting this 
problem by employing standardized coefficients. But since many of our independent 
variables are dummy variables for which standardization makes little sense, we have 
preferred to use ‘marginal effects’ (me) and describe in percentage points how the change 
in the response variable is related to changes in the explanatory variables. This gives us 
a clear and simple way of examining the substantive importance of the effects.
Diversity, Conflict, and Contact
It is commonly asked what processes are involved when we observe a negative (or, more 
rarely, positive) statistical association between an index of diversity and an indicator of 
social cohesion (Dawkins, 2008). Frequently, relying only on indices of diversity, we 
have little information on the basis of which to assess the mechanisms involved (Blau, 
1977; Quillian, 1995). A measure of residential diversity tells us nothing about the actual 
form and nature of inter-group relations in an area (Allport, 1954). We therefore explore 
theories of conflict and contact and treat them as explanatory mechanisms mediating the 
relationship between diversity and social cohesion (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Sturgis 
et al., 2011). Most of the overviewed studies have only attempted this half-way, we will 
argue: they control for level of neighbourhood deprivation through various different 
indices. According to Conflict Theory, under conditions of increased diversity, the major-
ity may feel threatened as to their economic and political power and feel that resources 
to which they are entitled are being usurped by newcomers. Hence they may display 
greater levels of intolerance (Blalock, 1967) or act to preserve ‘social distance’ from the 
minority groups (Bobo, 1988).
In addition to the standard measure of economic deprivation used by other scholars, 
we include subjective measures of potential conflict such as respondents’ self-assess-
ment of personal ‘economic precariousness’ (available only in EMBES), as studies have 
shown that the respondent’s economic concerns may have significant impact on their 
socializing and community participation (Graham, 2011). With the MCDS data, we 
introduce a subjective measure of the respondents’ perception of crime in their area. Fear 
of crime may well be a major source of ‘hunkering down’, and respondents feeling 
threatened by crime may exhibit heightened racial awareness (Quillian, 1995). We expect 
that the effects of threat, especially economic threat, will be asymmetrical, affecting the 
majority group more than minorities (Bobo, 1988).
According to the ‘contact’ theory developed by Allport (1954), racial prejudice will 
be reduced as a function of inter-group contact and integration. It should be remembered 
that diversity in itself merely provides opportunities for contact, and cannot be equated 
with actual contact. Very few studies examine whether contact has a mediating effect on 
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the relationship between diversity and cohesion as only a limited number of surveys 
include measures of inter-ethnic or inter-racial contact (Laurence, 2011; Semyonov and 
Glikman, 2009; Stolle et al., 2008). Semyonov and Glikman (2009) show with the 
European Social Survey that positive contacts are likely to reduce perception of threat 
and social distance. With British data, Laurence (2011) finds that bridging contact, meas-
ured as proportion of outgrouper friends, at best neutralizes the negative effect of diver-
sity but does not reverse it.
Research Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1. On the basis of the overviewed studies and policy reports, we expect 
that, for white British, our civic outcomes (both measures of hunkering down and 
identification with co-ethnics) are affected negatively by increased diversity. For 
minorities, diversity is also expected to lead to hunkering down but at the same time 
may reduce identification with co-ethnics.
Hypothesis 2. If there is a negative relationship between diversity and civicness 
among the white British, then this is expected to be mediated in part at least by threat. 
If there is a positive relationship among minorities, particularly with respect to iden-
tification with Britain, then this is expected to be mediated by contact.
Hypothesis 3. The effect of diversity on social cohesion is conditional on the presence 
of bridging ties and/or sources of conflict. Some significant moderating effects will 
thus be observed (exemplified by a series of interactions). For example, both white 
British and minority respondents who report low levels of bridging ties may be more 
negatively influenced by a rising percentage of outgroupers in their local area than 
respondents with medium and high levels of contact.
Data and Methodology
This study makes use of two major datasets with comparable questionnaire structure 
designed to measure a range of social and political attitudes and administered in 2010. 
The first is the Managing Cultural Diversity Survey (MCDS). This survey was a random 
location quota sample of 1609 individuals: 809 white British respondents; and, through 
an ethnic minority booster sample, 800 minority individuals. The second dataset is the 
2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES). The EMBES was a random 
probability sample that encompasses the major ethnic minority groups in the UK with a 
sample of 2782 minority individuals.
Geographical Units
A frequent criticism of diversity studies, such as that of Putnam (2007), is that they 
employ area units of analysis that vary greatly in size and, therefore, in their potential 
diversity mix, and are thus incomparable (Dawkins, 2008). The MCDS uses Middle 
Super Output Areas (MSOAs) as the primary sampling unit while the EMBES sample 
uses Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs). Compared to wards, MSOAs and LSOAs are 
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felt to be more appropriate for this analysis due to the fact that wards differ greatly in 
size.
The MCDS sampled 200 neighbourhoods with the average of 7.95 respondents per unit. 
The EMBES sample consists of data points spread across 582 neighbourhoods (LSOAs 
being nested within MSOAs) with the average size of the cluster being 5.5 individuals.
Independent Variables
We include a range of potential ‘confounding variables’ that previous research has found 
to be associated with the outcomes of interest (Laurence and Heath, 2008; Putnam, 2007; 
Sturgis et al., 2011; Twigg et al., 2010): age, gender, respondent’s marital status, type of 
accommodation, education, ethnicity, length of residence and generation (for the minor-
ity sample only).
Diversity
In this article, we use the index of ethnic fractionalization (EF) which has been devel-
oped as a measure of ethno-linguistic diversity (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) and is 
commonly used in the literature. We have tried other indices as well with similar results. 
The index has a simple interpretation, namely the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals from a given area will not belong to the same ethnic group; and ranges from 
0 to 1. The greater the value of the index, the greater the diversity.
FRAC = − = −
= =
∑ ∑1 12
1 1
1pi pi pii
i
N
i
i
N
( )
Where πi is the share of group i over the total of the population.
Conflict Measures
To measure economic deprivation (which we take to be a proxy for threat) within the 
observed communities, we will use the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD), which 
includes a range of economic, social and housing issues. It is a commonly used measure 
of neighbourhood economic deprivation (Laurence, 2011; Laurence and Heath, 2008; 
Sturgis et al., 2011, Twigg et al., 2010).
With the EMBES data, we can further control for whether or not the respondent has 
been a victim of racial discrimination. Minority members who have experienced dis-
crimination may be quite conservative in their residential choices and feel more comfort-
able in neighbourhoods surrounded by ingroupers (Krysan et al., 2009), which may make 
them less trusting and reluctant to pursue greater integration among white British.
Contact Measures
It is easier said than done to construct a meaningful contact measure. Often, contact 
measures are based on proportions. Thus, an individual with four friends, two of whom 
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are outgroupers will get the same score as an individual with 10 friends, five of whom 
are outgroupers, although the latter does have in fact more outgrouper friends (Laurence, 
2011). On the other hand, even if we know the exact number of friends whom the 
respondent has or the exact number of outgroupers with whom he or she interacts, it is 
unclear whether an increase by one more will be substantial and meaningful. One 
approach is to consider the contact variable in a zero-sum relationship – a dichotomy 
between those who do have some form of contact and those who have very little 
(Laurence, 2011).
Another important form of contact is through membership in associations. Not all 
individuals in our surveys participate in organizations. When they do it tends to be in 
organizations with predominantly ingrouper membership. Therefore, 50 percent penetra-
tion of outgrouper members in clubs and organizations can be viewed as quite high. We 
consider contact in organizations in which more than half of the members are ingroupers 
as a cut-off point for bonding contact.
We adopt a similar approach to bridging contact. With the MCDS data, we have a 
range of items that refer to actual mixing, socializing and brief encounters with out-
groupers (see Table 1). These variables correlate very highly and we build a bridging 
contact latent variable with eigenvalue of 1.25. The median of this latent contact variable 
is –0.181 for white British, and for minorities it is 0.167. The higher median among 
minorities is due to the greater number of outgroup contacts reported by minorities than 
vice versa (in EMBES, the median is three outgrouper friends). We do not want to be 
influenced by outliers – those individuals with very little or very high levels of contact; 
hence the use of median. We focus on people with low bridging contacts – the theory 
predicts that diversity will pose a threat particularly for this subset of the general popula-
tion (Allport, 1954) and will lead to a rise in prejudice and negative sentiments. However, 
there is the problem of endogeneity – people with high levels of bridging contact may 
have chosen to live in very diverse areas and vice versa. This issue can be addressed 
properly only through panel data, which unfortunately we do not have. A consolation is 
that we also capture less endogenous forms of contact such as brief encounters; and 
friendship networks might be formed at a wide variety of places other than neighbour-
hoods, for example at work. To achieve comparability with EMBES 2010 in which we 
only capture friendship networks with outgroupers (an ordinal variable), we use a dichot-
omous measure as with the MCDS based on median number of outgrouper friends.
Models
Our response variables are dichotomous (we have tried different recodes without sub-
stantive difference to the results); therefore we use the logit link. In addition, we take into 
account that several individuals belong to the same neighbourhood unit by correcting our 
standard errors for the clustering of the residuals. Observations for which the response 
‘No answer’ has been given for any of our dependent or independent variables have been 
deleted from the sample.
With both datasets,3 three sets of models for each outcome have been developed. The 
first is a baseline model which tests Hypothesis 1 with controls for individual socio-
economic predictors; the second and third models are the Conflict and Contact models, 
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which test Hypothesis 2 with the introduction of the mediating conflict and contact 
measures. In addition to these three sets of models we explore various interaction effects 
in line with Hypothesis 3.
Interpretation of Effects
We use average marginal effects, computed at different values of the X variables with the 
average of all these values then taken – an improvement on the mean-based approach, 
which in the case of dummy variables uses intermediary non-existent values. For continuous 
variables, the approach we adopt is to measure the effect of the change from the 10th per-
centile to the 90th percentile of our continuous explanatory variables (that is, diversity, IMD 
and age) averaged across different values of the other explanatory variables to avoid sensi-
tivity to the extreme values at the tails of the distributions (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).
Results
White British
In line with previous research, in our base model (Table 2 and Figure 1) we observe that, 
with an increase in ethnic fractionalization, both generalized and neighbourhood trust 
decrease. The relationship with willingness to help neighbours, although negative, is not 
significant. However, compared to diversity, the respondent’s socio-economic character-
istics are a stronger predictor of hunkering down. Holding a degree in comparison with 
having no education increases the probability to be trusting in general by 27 percentage 
points and increases neighbour trust by 12 percentage points. In contrast, moving from a 
homogeneous white British neighbourhood with few minority residents (10th percentile) 
to a diverse one with many minority residents (90th percentile) decreases this likelihood 
by five percentage points for both generalized and neighbourhood trust. This inclines us 
to think that, considering solely the baseline models, there is some negative but modest 
impact of increasing diversity among white British. Is co-ethnic identification similarly 
affected by diversity? Remember, we hypothesized that diversity will increase identifica-
tion with ingroupers in response to the pressures of growing heterogeneity. In contrast to 
what we predicted, in our baseline and conflict models, an increase in the percentage of 
non-white British in the area reduces identification with co-ethnics and quite signifi-
cantly so. Furthermore, for behavioural outcomes such as civic action and willingness to 
help neighbours, no significant association can be noted! Non-electoral forms of partici-
pation indeed do not seem to be significantly associated with changes in neighbourhood 
ethnic composition, and this is a pattern that holds for both white British and for minori-
ties as we will see in the next section.
We should mention that we observe some interesting relationships among the socio-
economic predictors. Social renting versus owning a home brings a dip in generalized 
trust, neighbourhood trust and willingness to help neighbours.4 If white British respond-
ents rent from their local council or housing association, they appear to be less trusting 
(private renters are also less willing to help neighbours) – suggestive perhaps of margin-
alization and alienation from the larger community.
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Still, one contribution of this article lies in going a step further from these frequently 
observed baseline relationships and in trying to distinguish between alternative ‘conflict’ 
or ‘contact’ explanations. When our conflict measures are introduced the observed asso-
ciation between growing diversity and declining social trust loses its 10 percent signifi-
cance. In support of our research hypotheses, fear of crime has a very significant and 
distinctive negative association with four of the outcome measures – if the white British 
respondents in our sample are worried about crime, this reduces their probability of trust-
ing in general by 26 percentage points, their trust in neighbours by 10 percentage points, 
willingness to help neighbours by eight points, and increases identification with white 
co-ethnics by 14 points. The effect of area deprivation, the other neighbourhood ‘con-
flict’ suspect is in fact insignificant.
Unfortunately, we do not know if the outlook on crime has a certain racial component 
to it as Quillian (1995) claims – this demands different research design and would be an 
interesting future line of research. So far, we can say however that white British respond-
ents hunker down most in contexts in which they feel threatened and less safe.
What about contact? Model 3 shows that contact mitigates the negative effect of 
diversity in terms of generalized trust; it also decreases substantially the probability of 
strong co-ethnic identification. Nevertheless, the positive influence of contacts with 
outgroupers does not outweigh the negative association between growing diversity and 
neighbourhood trust – a result replicating the findings of Stolle et al. (2008) and 
Laurence (2011) and in line with our Hypothesis 2. Otherwise, bridging contact has a 
strong positive relationship with our outcomes. The marginal effect of bonding contact 
is also positive but significant only in the generalized trust and civic action models. 
This is not surprising as numerous studies summarized in Putnam (2000) observe a 
strong relationship between willingness to act and associational involvement with 
ingroupers.
Figure 1. White British: Summary of Associations between Model Outcomes and Predictors 
of interest.
 at UNIV OF ESSEX on February 3, 2015soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
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Is co-ethnic identification similarly affected by diversity? Remember, we hypothe-
sized that diversity would increase identification with ingroupers in response to the pres-
sures of growing heterogeneity. In contrast to what we predicted, in our baseline and 
conflict models, an increase in the percentage of non-white British reduces identification 
with co-ethnics and quite significantly so. In our contact model, a four point decrease in 
the marginal effect of diversity is witnessed (from 16 to 12 points) but the coefficient 
remains significant. In other words contact is associated with a (partial) reduction in the 
likelihood of reactive ethnicity developing. Having bridging contacts leads to a reduction 
in the strength of identification by about 13 percentage points, similar to the marginal 
effect of degree-level education. In other words we find no sign of reinforcement of a 
symbolic white ‘stronghold’ identity with increasing diversity.
Minorities
The community spirit of minority respondents in our sample depends on the interplay of 
four characteristics: ethnicity, generation, conflict and bridging contacts.
We will start with ethnicity (Table 3 and Figure 2). Going through our range of differ-
ent outcomes, black Caribbeans trust less in general than Indians but appear more trustful 
of neighbours than other ethnic groups, particularly more trustful than black Africans 
and Indians. Black Caribbeans are however less willing to help neighbours compared to 
Bangladeshis and more likely to profess identification with their own ethnic group. A 
black Caribbean is 18 points more likely than a Pakistani to identify strongly with own 
ethnic group and 21 points more likely than a Bangladeshi respondent.
The effect of ethnicity is thus much more pronounced than the effect of education – 
our most stable and positive predictor for white British – pales by comparison. Having a 
degree does not have any impact on generalized trust, willingness to help neighbours or 
co-ethnic identification among minorities. Other predictors such as renting from the 
local council, however, act in a similar pattern to the one observed among the white 
British – social renters are less trustful and seemingly more exposed to marginalization. 
Thus, a minority social renter is four percentage points less likely to identify strongly 
with Britain than a minority homeowner.
Second-generation minority members, as a whole, exemplify lower levels of general-
ized trust. Being born in Britain worryingly lowers the probability of trusting people in 
general by seven points. For other outcomes, however, we observe the positive relation-
ship which might be expected in the second generation – for example, co-ethnic identifi-
cation also declines by seven points.
Most importantly, for our study, diversity does not appear to have a significant nega-
tive effective on civicness among minorities. Only one of the relationships between 
diversity and our outcome measures is significant and in the one significant case diver-
sity has a positive effect (increasing identification with Britain).
As in the previous section, conflict measures, particularly area deprivation, have a 
disengaging effect and – apart from the puzzling positive effect of growing deprivation 
on generalized trust and the more understandable increase in civicness for minority 
members who have experienced discrimination (perhaps trying to counteract discrimina-
tion through non-electoral forms of participation) – it is uniformly negative and 
 at UNIV OF ESSEX on February 3, 2015soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
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significant. This goes against our expectation from realistic group threat theory that con-
flict would have a stronger adverse effect on majority members than on minorities.
In terms of contact, both bridging and associational bonding register a positive rela-
tionship with cohesion outcomes. Minority members who have median or high levels of 
bridging contact are, for example, six percentage points more likely to be trustful than 
those who have low contact levels; they are seven percentage points more likely to trust 
their neighbours and eight percentage points more willing to help them. Through bridg-
ing comes a greater sense of belonging to Britain rather than to one’s own ethnic group 
– there is a decline in co-ethnic identification of seven percentage points.
Interaction Effects
In order to test Hypothesis 3, we have run six interaction models for each of our five 
outcomes of interest. With so many models, one can expect that some interaction effects 
will appear significant without any substantive backing (often termed ‘false positives’). 
Indeed, we notice one significant result: there is an interaction effect significant at the 10 
percent level between bonding, diversity and generalized trust among minority mem-
bers. Thus, with an increase in bonding contacts and diversity, generalized trust decreases. 
As the effect is weak, we are cautious to over-interpret this result and to suggest it sup-
ports policy concerns that associational bonding among minority members brings dete-
rioration of the civic mindedness. The rest of the interactions do not reach statistical 
levels of significance.
Figure 2. Minorities: Summary of Associations between Model Outcomes and Predictors of 
interest.
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Discussion
If we were to build an imaginary profile of the most trusting and helpful white British 
citizens in our dataset, these would be individuals who are not social renters, are highly 
educated, mix with outgroupers but, importantly, live in diverse areas in which they are 
not worried about crime.
The profile of the minority members who resist ‘hunkering down’ tendencies is some-
what similar – they are home owners with outgrouper contacts; they are first generation 
especially in terms of generalized trust but second generation when it comes to their 
identity with Britain.
Importantly, there is no sign of reinforcement of either a symbolic white or minority 
‘stronghold’ identity, or a decline in civic engagement with an increase of diversity. 
Conflict measures at the individual level have by far the most pervasive and consistent 
negative association across all our models which outweighs even the negative influence 
recorded on the part of neighbourhood deprivation for white British.
This article has addressed several popular conjectures in the literature on diversity and 
civic engagement. First of all, it has consistently shown that, even if a negative associa-
tion between diversity and civic engagement is observed, this relationship is much 
weaker in terms of size compared to the profound effect of some individual predictors. 
Moreover, by including outcome measures such as co-ethnic identification and civic 
participation, we can safely say, first, that diversity plays a positive role in the formation 
of feelings that transcend the respondent’s own ethnicity, a result that is observed both 
among white British and minorities. Second, growing diversity does not have a negative 
impact on civic action – a crucial aspect of hunkering down – at all. Notably, since our 
measure of bridging contact in the MCDS data includes brief daily encounters with out-
groupers not specific to the neighbourhood, we suggest (notwithstanding taking endoge-
neity problems very seriously) that bridging contacts are indeed important; minority 
respondents who had little contact with outgroupers in our sample were at greater risk of 
becoming less trusting and identifying less with Britain. However, we do not find strong 
evidence through interaction effects that deprivation or lack of outgrouper contacts mod-
erates the way in which majority group and minority respondents are affected by grow-
ing diversity in their neighbourhoods. Perhaps this would change if direct measures of 
racial prejudice and stereotyping were included in the models but unfortunately they are 
not available in the present datasets.5
More generally, diversity seems to have broadly symmetrical effects on minorities 
and on the white British majority group, as do inter-group contacts. There is little evi-
dence that diversity is ‘good’ for minorities but ‘bad’ for the white British. While the 
negative effects are sometimes significant for the white British but non-significant for 
minorities, they are substantively small, except when it comes to the positive effects on 
identity. The largest differences between majority and minorities are in the roles of edu-
cation and fear of crime – both major drivers for the majority group, albeit in opposite 
directions. Diversity is clearly here to stay and our findings on the positive effects of 
inter-group contact suggest that we should not be pessimistic about the implications of 
diversity. It should certainly not be allowed to distract us from tackling more pressing 
issues of deprivation and fear of crime.
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Notes
1. We run several models with trust in neighbours, willingness to help neighbours and co-ethnic 
identity as ordinal rather than dummy variables. The results do not change substantively.
2. We prefer the index of ethnic fractionalization which is commonly used in the literature to 
which we want to relate. Other indices such as the index of dissimilarity (see Peach, 2009) are 
of interest and provide an important comparison between neighbourhood and authority level 
diversity; nevertheless, the focus of this article is on primarily neighbourhood processes such 
as trust formation – hence the use of ethnic fractionalization.
3. We have redone the generalized trust, co-ethnic identity and civic action models with MCDS 
minorities’ data and we observe the same results. Full tables are available on request.
4. All our MCDS models control for length of residence (available only with MCDS data), 
which is often used as a proxy for community attachment (Sturgis et al., 2011) but we do not 
find this predictor to be significantly associated with the outcomes of interest.
5. Including measures of stereotyping is very common in USA-based surveys and these have 
been found to be powerful moderators of neighbourhood preferences (Krysan et al., 2009).
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